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Abstract: Recently, Duncan Pritchard presents a very convincing theory of knowledge, called “anti-luck 
virtue epistemology” (viz. ALVE). This theory holds that knowledge must have two basic conditions, namely 
ability condition and anti-luck condition. The former means knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability, 
while the latter means knowledge must rule out epistemic luck. Pritchard argues that this theory is superior to 
other kinds of virtue epistemology, because it not only can provide more intuitive explanation of the nature and 
structure of knowledge, but also can better address the value problem of knowledge, especially the tertiary value 
problem. However, it has several serious problems: it exaggerated the role of luck in the theory of knowledge, and 
wrongly used Craig’s concept genealogy.
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普 里 查 德 的 知 识 论 背 后 的 真 正 动 机 是 知
识 的 价 值 问 题， 或 者 我 们 可 以 把 他 的 知 识 论
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S 的真信念 p 构成了一个认知成就，当且仅当，





功：S 的真信念 p 构成了一种认知成就，当且仅当 S
拥有一个真信念 p 主要是因其 S 的认知能力而是可
信任的；
2）聚焦于信念的（belief-focused）的认知成
































































































情况：A 对这样一个问题感兴趣，即 B 现在所观察
的平面是否是红色的，但他本人并不知道答案；在
这种情境下，A 想要指出 B 有权不再询问这个问
题；而就当前的假设而言，知识将允许他做到这点，
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